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Surging pharmaceutical prices in the United States create 
financial strain for patients, insurance companies, and state 
and federal governments. Regulatory delays and coverage 
denials due to product prices can also affect shareholders of 
pharmaceutical companies by depressing stock prices. While 
a number of industry leaders have acknowledged that 
dramatic price hikes can damage their businesses, many 
pharmaceutical companies have not demonstrated a 
willingness to scale back prices.  
This Note considers the use of shareholder proposals to 
address drug pricing policies at the company level. While 
shareholders of most companies are generally unable to 
address pricing policies, a carve-out created by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission allows shareholders of publicly 
traded pharmaceutical companies to do so. This Note studies 
how shareholders can use the carve-out to push for price 
restraint by either causing a company to include a price 
restraint proposal in its proxy materials and annual meeting 
or causing management to negotiate with proponent 
 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2011, Rhodes 
College. Many thanks to Professor Albert Choi and Professor Eric Talley 
for their invaluable insight throughout the Note-writing process. 
Additional thanks to the staff and editorial board of the Columbia 
Business Law Review for their support in preparing this Note for 
publication, and to my husband, family, and friends for their support. All 
errors are my own.
GOEMAN –FINAL  
No. 2:748] THE PRICE ISN’T RIGHT 749 
shareholders in order to convince the shareholders to 
withdraw their proposals.  
By evaluating the success of prior attempts to impact drug 
prices through shareholder proposals, this Note concludes 
that institutional investors are the linchpin of shareholder 
success, whether that success is through a vote at the annual 
meeting or a compromise at the negotiation table. This Note 
therefore calls on institutional investors to evaluate their 
portfolios and consider using shareholder proposals to unlock 
firm value and relieve the financial pressure created by 
rapidly rising drug prices.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
By 2020, Americans are expected to spend $610–$640 
billion annually on pharmaceutical drugs.1 These surging 
costs create financial pressure for patients,2 insurance 
companies,3 and, through funding of programs like Medicaid, 
state and federal governments.4 Despite political insistence 
 
 
1 THE IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINES USE 
AND SPENDING IN THE U.S. 5 (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/IMS-Institute-US-Drug-Spending-2015.pdf 
[perma.cc/X4RZ-DRWB]. 
2 STAFF OF S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG., SUDDEN PRICE 
SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS 
MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 98 (Comm. Print 2016) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 
MONOPOLY]. 
3 Id. at 110. 
4 Id.; Letter from Meredith Miller, Chief Corp. Governance Officer, 
UAW Retiree Med. Benefits Tr., to Vertex Pharm. Inc. S’holders (May 15, 
2015), http://apps.shareholder.com/sec/viewerContent.aspx?companyid=VR 
TX&docid=10707393 [perma.cc/XS4S-7F2U] [hereinafter UAW, Letter to 
Vertex]. 
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on price containment,5 many pharmaceutical companies have 
not demonstrated a willingness to scale back specialty drug 
prices,6 even while industry leaders acknowledge that price 
hikes damage their businesses.7 
Shareholder proposals8 are a tool through which both 
institutional and independent shareholders can force 
management to consider certain corporate policies by holding 
a shareholder vote. This process allows shareholders to 
influence corporate governance, communicate their views to 
other shareholders, and pressure management to implement 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Inquiry 
Into URL Pharma and Avanir Pharm. Pricing of Popular Prescription 
Drugs Begins (May 24, 2011), https://www.aging.senate.gov/press-
releases/inquiry-into-url-pharma-and-avanir-pharmaceuticals-pricing-of-
popular-prescription-drugs-begins [perma.cc/4X4P-NVVV]; Press Release, 
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, Collins, McCaskill Open Senate 
Investigation into Rx Drug Pricing, Announce Intention to Hold Hearings 
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/collins-
mccaskill-open-senate-investigation-into-rx-drug-pricing-announce-
intention-to-hold-hearings [perma.cc/TQ76-45J7]; see generally STAFF OF S. 
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG., SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-
PATENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT 
HARMS PATIENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2016). 
6 Specialty drugs are a designation of pharmaceuticals classified as 
high-cost and often include biologic drugs, drugs with special handling 
requirements, and drugs with limited distribution. Patrick P. Gleason, et 
al., Health Plan Utilization and Costs of Specialty Drugs Within 4 Chronic 
Conditions, J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY (2013), 
http://www.jmcp.org/doi/10.18553/jmcp.2013.19.7.542 
[https://perma.cc/7YM5-SZYH]. For a discussion on surging specialty drug 
prices, see infra Section II.A. 
7 See Liz Hoffman & Michael Rapoport, Valeant’s Michael Pearson 
Admits Aggressive Drug-Price Increases Were a Mistake, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
27, 2016, 8:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/valeant-steering-away-
from-aggressive-price-increases-officials-tell-senators-1461790103 
[perma.cc/ZD53-L4WC]; see also Bill Ackman Asked for Information in 
Drug Pricing Probe, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/24/bill-ackman-valeant-drug-price-investigation 
[perma.cc/J55X-RALJ]. 
8 For an explanation of shareholder proposals, see infra Section III.B.  
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their proposals “at both the shareholder-to-shareholder and 
shareholder-to-management levels.”9 
Since the 1990s, shareholders have tried to use proposals 
to influence pricing strategies, urging companies selling 
high-priced pharmaceuticals to exercise price restraint or to 
report on the effect of price surges on the companies’ bottom 
lines and long-term financial health.10 Getting these 
proposals on the table was a triumph in itself, as pricing 
strategy proposals are generally excluded from proxy 
materials under a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC” or “Commission”) exception.11 Yet, unfortunately for 
proponents, these proposals often fail.12 
The key to a successful proposal lies in the advocacy 
power held by institutional shareholders. Such parties, 
though perhaps unresponsive to the social controversy 
surrounding the pricing of specialty and niche 
pharmaceutical drugs, may nevertheless have financial 
incentives to seek some level of price restraint on overpriced 
pharmaceutical products in order to protect their 
 
 
9 Elise N. Rindfleisch, Note, Shareholder Proposals: A Catalyst for 
Climate Change-Related Disclosure, Analysis, and Action?, 5 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 45, 57 (2008).  
10 See Eli Lilly and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 54306, at *1 
(Feb. 25, 1993); Warner-Lambert Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 
223668, at *1 (Feb. 21, 2000). 
11 For the ordinary business exclusion, see Shareholder Proposals, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(7) (2017). For examples of how this exclusion is used 
to omit pricing policy proposals, see Verizon Com. Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2016 WL 7384046, at *1 (Dec. 16, 2016) (“There appears to be some 
basis for your view that Verizon may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-
8(i)(7), as relating to Verizon’s ordinary business operations. In this 
regard, we note that the proposal relates to Verizon’s discount pricing 
policies.”). See also Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 
96410, at *1 (Jan. 31, 2011) (excluding a proposal under the ordinary 
business exclusion because, generally, the setting of prices for products 
and services is fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on 
a day-to-day basis). 
12 See infra Section III.A.2. 
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investments.13 The self-interest of an institutional investor 
therefore helps resolve a social issue.14 Without significant 
engagement and expenditure on the part of proponent 
shareholders, the victory of getting a proposal included in a 
company’s proxy materials in the first place may backfire. A 
resubmission rule bars future similar proposals if prior 
proposals did not receive a threshold vote percentage, so 
unsuccessful attempts can impede future efforts.15 
This Note argues that institutional shareholders, as a 
result of holding large blocs of stock in target companies and 
having the funds to widely circulate materials to 
shareholders and the media, are in the best position to 
unlock shareholder value by utilizing the shareholder 
proposal mechanism, but that the mechanism may 
ultimately prove unsuccessful without their engagement and 
expenditure. Specifically, through the shareholder proposal 
mechanism, institutional investors can pressure 
pharmaceutical companies to implement reasonable price 
restraint policies and consider and report on current pricing 
schemes’ effects on their long-term financial health.16 If 
institutional shareholders do not begin taking an active role, 
shareholders may lose access to the SEC-created carve-out 
for proposals relating to pharmaceutical prices due to the 
resubmission rule.17 
Part II of this Note discusses the rise in pharmaceutical 
prices and summarizes the shareholder proposal rule as well 
 
 
13 A company’s long-term financial health may be negatively impacted 
by loss in market share, delayed product approvals, and damaged 
reputations among consumers and medical professionals, leading to 
shareholder losses which, with appropriate foresight, institutional 
investors may see coming and seek to alleviate by way of pricing 
modifications. See infra Section II.B. 
14 See, e.g., UAW, Letter to Vertex, supra note 4. 
15 For more information on the resubmission rule, see infra Section 
II.C.4. 
16 For common forms that proposals for fair pricing of pharmaceutical 
products take, see infra Section III.A.1. 
17 See infra Section III.A.1.ii. 
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as the exceptions to that rule on which companies most 
frequently relied when seeking permission to omit 
shareholder proposals from their proxy materials and annual 
meetings. Part III evaluates previous shareholder proposals 
for pharmaceutical price restraint and discusses company 
and SEC responses to those proposals, including the 
impacts—both through the shareholder voting process and 
outside of it through institutional investors—of those 
proposals on company policy. Part IV considers the 
implications of this Note’s findings for the viability of 
shareholder proposals seeking to make drug price changes, 
calls on institutional investors to “use it or lose it” by actively 
leveraging the shareholder proposal mechanism, and 
suggests specific pension funds that may be properly 
incentivized to do so. 
II. BACKGROUND ON PHARMACEUTICAL 
PRICING AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
A. Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Pricing 
With Americans currently spending upward of $425 
billion on prescription drugs each year,18 pharmaceutical 
pricing is in the public spotlight. Prices often fluctuate 
wildly. One example, Novartis’ leukemia drug, was originally 
priced at $24,000 per-patient upon approval by the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) but jumped to $90,000 per-
patient a decade later without explanation.19 Some large 
pharmaceutical companies target pharmaceutical products 
for acquisition with a plan to substantially raise the cost to 
 
 
18 Michelle Cortez, Prescription Drug Spending Hits Record $425 
Billion in U.S., BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2016-04-14/prescription-drug-
spending-hits-record-425-billio n-in-u-s [perma.cc/8HPT-SYMG]. 
19 Lacie Glover, Oncologists Worry About Rising Costs of Cancer 
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consumers for the same product post-acquisition.20 Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals, for example, admitted to strategically 
acquiring pharmaceutical products where “a central premise 
was a planned increase in the prices of the medicines.”21 
After these acquisitions, Valeant raised the prices of some 
acquired drugs by hundreds of percentage points.22 
B. Negative Impacts of Current Prices 
Even with insurance, patients pay hefty out-of-pocket 
treatment costs and rising premiums through which they 
become the primary bearers of the financial burden imposed 
by skyrocketing prices.23 In order to maintain treatment 
regimens, patients often accumulate debt; cancer patients, 
for example, are 2.5 times more likely to file for bankruptcy 
than people who do not have cancer.24 While there may be 
other factors influencing patients’ financial troubles, such as 
 
 
20 Jonathan D. Rockoff & Ed Silverman, Pharmaceutical Companies 
Buy Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2015, 
9:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-companies-buy-
rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-prices-1430096431 [perma.cc/9992-QLUD]. 
21 Cynthia Koons & Anna Edney, Ackman, Valeant Offer Apologies, 
Concessions at Drug Hearing, BLOOMBERG (April 27, 2016, 5:58 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/valeant-s-regrets-
may-not-appease-senators-at-drug-price-hearing [perma.cc/7YYB-W9ZQ]. 
22 Valeant’s product Nitropress rose by 525% in price. Isuprel rose 
212%. See Democrats on House Panel Attack Heart Drug Price Increases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1iXzGVq [perma.cc/8UBB-
LYUK]. 
23 Insurance companies may absorb some of the financial burden of 
increasing drug prices; however, in addition to requiring patients to pay a 
percentage of the drug price (which may be dramatically increased at any 
time), many insurers also raise premiums in order to cover their rising 
costs, thus passing on the financial burden to their insured patients in 
multiple ways. Further, taxpayers as a whole “underwrite the cost of 
prescription drugs provided by Medicare, Medicaid and other public 
insurance programs.” Liz Szabo, Skyrocketing Drug Prices Leave Cures out 
of Reach for Some Patients, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2016, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/14/rising-drug-prices/ 
71077100 [perma.cc/Y7U7-Y73H]. 
24 Szabo, supra note 23. 
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job loss or the inability to work while receiving treatment, 
cancer treatment has become so expensive that it presents 
an unmistakable hurdle to the average person. New cancer 
drugs are “routinely” priced at over $100,000 per year, which 
is nearly twice the average household income.25 Such 
burdensome costs often lead patients to either risk their 
financial wellbeing in order to receive the recommended 
treatment or risk their physical wellbeing by “rationing” 
their treatments to reduce costs.26 
In addition to being a financial burden, rising prices 
create negative externalities for patient access, leading to 
direct impacts on healthcare quality. Some patients are 
denied access to expensive but highly effective drugs by their 
insurance carriers.27 For example, Sovaldi, which was 
approved by the FDA in 2013, has been shown to cure 90% of 
chronic hepatitis C patients within twelve weeks, and yet, 
because of its $1000 per-pill price, many Medicaid programs 
are “sharply restricting access” to the drug and “offering it 
only to the sickest patients.”28 
Medical professionals have begun to censure companies 





27 Jake Harper, States Deny Pricey Hepatitis C Drugs to Most 
Medicaid Patients, NPR (Dec. 27, 2015, 5:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/health-shots/2015/12/27/460086615/states-deny-pricey-hepatitis-c-
drugs-to-most-medicaid-patients [perma.cc/VX4Z-K9ND]; Olga Khazan, 
The True Cost of an Expensive Medication, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/an-expensive-medicati 
ons-human-cost/407299 [perma.cc/XVE4-9CEV]. 
28 Szabo, supra note 23. 
29 Ed Silverman, Cancer Doctors Raise Pressure on Pharma Industry 
to Cut Drug Prices, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/edsilverman/2013/04/25/cancer-doctors-raise-pressure-on-phar 
ma-industry-to-cut-drug-prices/#2174f1c3d156 [https://perma.cc/B6QH-A4 
Y2]; Ayalew Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven Initiative and 
Petition to Lower the High Price of Cancer Drugs, 90 MAYO CLINIC 
PROCEEDINGS 996, 996–1000 (Aug. 2015), http://www.mayoclinic 
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Kettering Cancer Center refused to continue prescribing a 
cancer drug that cost over twice as much as a similarly 
effective medicine offered by another company.30 Medicaid 
programs have begun to deny coverage of some high-priced 
drugs.31 While this response by medical professionals and 
insurance institutions may be motivated by a desire to 
pressure pharmaceutical companies to lower prices, it also 
further impairs patient access to otherwise beneficial 
treatment by proscribing use of certain medications. 
1. Possible Explanations for Price Increases 
Several factors may contribute to the rise in prescription 
medication prices. Explanations often draw upon the 
significant investment in research and development (“R&D”) 
that is needed to discover, test, and manufacture drugs to 
meet existing medical needs.32 Drug executives often say 





30 Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
14, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-
to-an-11000-a-month-cancer-drug.html [https://perma.cc/9WFX-X3Z7] 
(stating that costs for Zaltrap averaged $11,063 per month). 
31 Joseph Walker, Costly Vertex Drug Is Denied, and Medicaid 
Patients Sue, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/ costly-drug-vertex-is-denied-and-medicaid-
patients-sue-1405564205 [perma.cc/WJR9-PF9H] (stating that Arkansas 
Medicaid officials denied cystic-fibrosis patients access to medication 
because of its cost); Harper, supra note 27 (stating that Indiana Medicaid 
denied coverage of highly effective Hepatitis C medication and that 
Medicaid in at least thirty-four states generally does not pay for the 
treatment unless the patient has already demonstrated significant liver 
damage). 
32 See Matthew S. Openshaw, The Economics of Prescription Drug 
Prices, Government Intervention and the Importation of Drugs from 
Canada, 23 NURS. ECON. J. 307, 307–11 (2005), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/521378 [https://perma.cc/6K24-
P824]. 
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billion and takes ten-to-fifteen years.33 Pharmaceutical 
prices may reflect those financial and time investments. 
Patent protection, which incentivizes companies to make 
up-front R&D investments by providing temporary monopoly 
power to patented drugs, may contribute to high 
pharmaceutical prices.34 When a company holds the patent 
rights to a new medication, there is no competition from 
other drugs with the same composition, meaning “there is no 
downward pressure on the price from other potential drug 
suppliers.”35 This system may allow the patent holder to set 
its own price, but in doing so encourages R&D investment.36 
It should be noted, however, that while patent protection 
may explain high prices of newly patented medications, it 
may not explain subsequent price increases for those 
medications (whether raised by the original patent holder or 
by a company that purchased the patent from the original 
holder) or price increases for generic medications.37  
Companies may also price their drugs to reflect total R&D 
cost, including compensation for both investments in market-
ready medications and losses on investments in previous 
medications that failed to receive FDA approval. Companies 
seeking approval from the FDA must test new drugs in a 
series of clinical trials, each time requiring approval from an 
 
 
33 Amy Nordrum, Why Are Prescription Drugs So Expensive? Big 
Pharma Points to the Cost of Research and Development, Critics Say That’s 
No Excuse, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 19, 2015, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/why-are-prescription-drugs-so-expensive-big-
pharma-points-cost-research-development-1928263 [https://perma.cc/S566-
M5WV] (the article notes that critics are wary of the explanation given by 
drug company executives). 
34 Openshaw, supra note 32. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 However, it should be noted that even when a company does 
purchase a medication post-approval, it may pay a premium for it, 
particularly if the medication is still under patent protection. See Richard 
L. Fuller & Norbert Goldfield, Paying for On-Patent Pharmaceuticals: 
Limit Prices and the Emerging Role of a Pay for Outcomes Approach, 39 J. 
AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 143, 144 (2016). 
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institutional review board to proceed to the next phase.38 The 
criteria for permission to proceed with clinical trials differs 
by phase, but generally involves a review of the drug’s safety 
and effectiveness.39 Even after reaching early stage Phase I 
clinical trials, only one out of ten drugs is permitted to 
proceed through Phase 3 clinical trials and finally receives 
FDA approval.40 Because of the difficulty in obtaining 
approval through this process, the average pharmaceutical 
product in development is unlikely to create an ongoing 
revenue stream. With this in mind, companies may seek 
compensation for development risk associated with the 
marketed drug or wish to offset previous development losses 
on unsuccessful drugs that were precursors of the successful 
drug. Many companies argue that their pricing schemes 
reflect the “high price tags . . . [of] the costs and effort of 
developing the drugs.”41 Boards of directors of 
pharmaceutical companies rely on this argument when 
urging shareholders to vote against proposals seeking price 
restraint and reporting.42 
2. Shareholder Motivations 
Shareholders seeking price restraint may have divergent 
motivations. First, shareholders may be motivated by the 
desire to protect the interests of healthcare consumers and 
 
 
38 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, The FDA’s Drug Review 




40 Bill Berkot, Success Rates for Experimental Drugs Fall: Study, 
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
pharmaceuticals-success-idUSTRE71D2U920110214 [https://perma.cc/ 
K4AW-2V5M]. 
41 Walker, supra note 31. 
42 See Celgene Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Apr. 30, 
2015). 
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the stability of the industry.43 The UAW Retiree Medical 
Benefits Trust (“UAW”), in its letter to the SEC regarding 
Gilead’s request for an SEC no-action letter (“no-action 
letter”),44 noted concerns regarding “actual and potential 
responses by payers and prescribers,” “the impact of high 
prices on patient access,” and “the financial sustainability of 
the broader health care system.”45 A group of institutional 
investors recently called on seventeen drug companies to 
increase price transparency due to concerns that rising costs 
make it difficult for patients to access prescription drugs.46 
These motivations sound in concerns for patients who lack 
access to medication or who experience financial distress 
because of the cost of medication, as well as concern for the 
stability of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. 
Second, there may be a financial incentive for price 
restraint: higher returns in the long run. Meredith Miller, 
Chief Corporate Governance Officer at UAW, said of the 
trust’s shareholder proposals that the trust was “looking out 
for [its] long-term interests and investments.”47 If a 
pharmaceutical company’s stock value is depressed because 
of issues that stem from its pricing policies, shareholders 
 
 
43 Dave Barkholz, Institutional Investors Fight for More Sway at 
Healthcare Companies, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 14, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160514/magazine/305149981 
[https://perma.cc/YD79-MEKD]. 
44 In this instance, UAW submitted a shareholder proposal to Gilead. 
In response, Gilead asked the SEC to issue a no-action letter that would 
allow Gilead to omit the proposal from its proxy voting materials. For 
more information on the shareholder proposal process and an explanation 
of no-action letters, see infra Section III.B. 
45 Gilead Sciences, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 6984699, at 
*3 (Jan. 22, 2015). 
46 Peter Loftus, Faith-Based Investor Group Calls for Drugmakers to 




47 See Barkholz, supra note 43. 
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may be motivated to restore that value by submitting 
proposals to the board. 
Loss in market share, delayed product approvals, and 
damaged reputations among consumers and medical 
professionals all contribute to shareholder losses. A 
shareholder support letter accompanying a shareholder’s 
pricing proposal to Celgene Corporation noted that, after the 
drug Revlimid rose in cost from $8500 per year in 2010 to 
$156,000 per year in 2014, the company encountered 
“difficulties in obtaining coverage for Revlimid . . . without 
price concessions” and was likely to continue struggling 
because of the cost of the drug.48 The shareholder proposal to 
Vertex cited tangible impacts of the company’s pricing 
strategy, noting that Arkansas’ Medicaid program denied 
coverage of the company’s cystic-fibrosis drug “because of its 
cost,” leading the company to lose revenue that would have 
come from Medicaid patients.49 The drug’s cost also caused 
the company to face price pushback in the United Kingdom 
and Canada, leading to eighteen-month approval delays.50 
Such setbacks, and the public image problems that may 
accompany them, often correlate with a change in stock 
value. After an extended period during which Valeant 
acquired pharmaceutical products and systematically 
increased prices, the outgoing CEO told the Senate that 
Valeant’s price hikes were a mistake;51 amid investigation 
and controversy surrounding its drug pricing, Valeant lost 
more than 85% of its stock market value.52 As a Valeant 
shareholder, activist investor Bill Ackman’s recommendation 
for returning shareholder value was to “reduce the prices of 
those drugs” and begin using “socially responsible pricing” so 
 
 
48 Celgene Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 496500, at *8 (Mar. 
19, 2015). 
49 See UAW, Letter to Vertex, supra note 4. 
50 See UAW, Letter to Vertex, supra note 4. 
51 See Hoffman & Rapoport, supra note 7. 
52 See Koons & Edney, supra note 21. 
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that “all hospitals could have access.”53 Similarly, when a 
large pharmacy benefit manager refused to continue 
covering some of Gilead Pharmaceuticals’ high-priced 
specialty drugs, the company’s stock price took a 17% 
plunge.54 
Board members owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders55 
and, while they will not be scrutinized with regard to most 
business decisions, their decisions must still be reasonable 
and include consideration of the shareholders to which they 
are fiduciaries.56 Thus, shareholders may expect to have 
recourse to the board when they believe pricing policies are 
to blame for stock losses. 
C. Mechanics of a Shareholder Proposal: Rule 14a-8 
When shareholders are motivated to adjust a company’s 
policies, one tool for change is Rule 14a-8: the town meeting 
rule. Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
regulated by the SEC, governs proxy materials of publicly-
held companies, permitting shareholders to put forth 
proposals for proxy voting.57 Provided that the proposal does 




54 Gilead Sciences Inc. (Form PX14A6G) (Apr. 28, 2015). 
55 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463–64 (1928). This reference 
comes from a joint venture rather than a corporation; however, it has been 
used to describe the fiduciary relationships between parties in trusts, 
partnerships, and corporations, and thus courts have implicitly recognized 
that a fiduciary duty has the same general nature, regardless of where it 
is found. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) 
(discussing directors’ fiduciary duty of care); In re Caremark Intl Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing directors’ 
fiduciary duty of care); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. (discussing 
enhanced fiduciary duties to ensure a board is not acting primarily in its 
own interests); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (discussing fiduciary duties where the sale or break-
up of a company is inevitable). 
56 John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 823, 847 (1988). 
57 Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
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meets minimum requirements is entitled to inclusion of his 
or her proposal in a company’s proxy materials and a vote on 
the proposal at the company’s annual meeting.58 At a 
minimum, the shareholder must have continually owned 
either $2000 in market value of the company’s securities or 
1% of the company’s voting securities for at least one year by 
the date of submission;59 the proposal must be introduced as 
a resolution; and only one proposal may be introduced per 
shareholder at the shareholders’ meeting, at which the 
proponent shareholder must be present.60 Shareholder 
proposals typically fall into one of two categories: Corporate 
Governance Proposals that relate to governance issues such 
as board structure, compensation disclosure, and director 
election; and Corporate Social Responsibility Proposals 
(“CSR Proposals”), including pharmaceutical pricing 
proposals, which relate to social motivations and are 
“designed to try to change corporate behavior in a way the 
proponent believes would be socially beneficial.”61 
Within Rule 14a-8, the SEC provides exceptions that 
allow a company to omit the proposal from their proxy 
materials. These “exclusions” apply to proposals that (1) are 
not a “proper subject” for shareholder action under state law, 
(2) are not “significantly related” to the business of the 
company, (3) relate to the company’s “ordinary business 
operations,” (4) relate to the specific amount of dividends, (5) 
relate to director or officer elections, (6) directly conflict with 
a management proposal, (7) duplicate another proposal 
already included in the proxy materials, (8) are substantially 
similar to another proposal submitted over the past five 
years, (9) would require the company to violate a law if 
passed, (10) are contrary to the SEC proxy rules, (11) relate 




59 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1). 
60 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(h)(1). 
61 WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES 
ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 211 (5th ed. 2016). 
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company’s power to effect, or (13) have been rendered moot 
by the company already substantially implementing that 
which is proposed by the shareholder.62 This Note will 
further address the three exclusions most frequently relied 
upon in pharmaceutical pricing proposals: (1) the ordinary 
business operations exclusion, (2) the mootness due to 
substantial implementation exclusion, and (3) the 
substantially similar to another proposal exclusion. 
1. Utilizing an Exclusion: SEC No-Action Letters 
When company management receives a shareholder 
proposal, they often wish to omit it from their annual 
meeting. In this instance, the company must notify the 
shareholder and give them fourteen days to amend their 
proposal.63 If, after that period, the company still wishes to 
exclude the proposal, it must submit to the SEC a copy of the 
proposal along with any supporting statements by the 
shareholder and a letter explaining the grounds on which the 
company intends to omit it.64 If the SEC staff (“Staff”) agrees 
with the company that the proposal may be properly omitted, 
it will issue a no-action letter in which an “authorized staff 
official indicates that the Staff will not recommend any 
enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed 
transaction described in the incoming correspondence is 
consummated.”65 If the Staff disagrees with the company, it 
may state in its response (also called a no-action letter) that 
it is “unable to assure the writer that [it] will not recommend 
enforcement action to the Commission if the transaction 
 
 
62 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i). 
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(f). 
64 SEC Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff 
Advice with Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 9344, 1976 WL 
160411, at *2 (July 7, 1976); SEC Division of Corporation Finance: Staff 
Legal Bulletin No. 14, 2001 WL 34886112, at *2 (July 13, 2001); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8(j)(2). 
65 Procedures Utilized by the Div. of Corp. Fin. for Rendering 
Informal Advice, Release No. 6253, 1980 WL 25632, at *1 n.2 (Oct. 28, 
1980). 
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occurs in the manner proposed by the writer.”66 Without 
having demonstrated that the proposal falls under an 
omission exclusion, the company should, and commonly does, 
include the proposal in its proxy materials.67 
No-action letters are generally not subject to judicial 
review, and thus the letters themselves are the strongest 
indicator of how Rule 14a-8 has been interpreted over time.68 
Section 26 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives 
federal courts jurisdiction over suits “brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder.”69 If a company refuses to include a 
proposal in its proxy materials, despite a no-action letter to 
the contrary, a court may grant review in order to determine 
the appropriate remedy for the proponent shareholder.70 In 
such instances, the company bears the burden of 




67 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; John G. Matsusaka et. al., Why Do Managers 
Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter 
Decisions 7 (USC Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. CLASS17-4, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881408.  
68 See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory 
Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a 
Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 945 (1998) (“[T]he 
availability of judicial review depends on whether the Commission 
reviewed and approved the particular no-action letter. In cases where the 
Commission has refused to review a no-action letter issued by the staff, 
direct judicial review under either the federal securities statutes’ review 
provisions or the APA is generally foreclosed because there is no final 
agency action to review.”); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers 
Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 258 (2d. Cir. 1994) (denying judicial review of 
an SEC no-action letter); Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643–44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (finding no jurisdiction to review staff decisions stated in no-
action letters which have not been examined by the Commission and 
where the Commission has not expressed a view of its own). 
69 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 821 F. Supp. 877, 879 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
70 See Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 331, 
334 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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proposal under an exception to Rule 14a-8.”71 Rule 14a-8 has 
also been at issue in court where shareholders who sensed 
that the company would not abide by an SEC mandate to 
include their proposal sued proactively to enjoin the 
company from issuing proxy materials without it.72 Such 
suits represent shareholder attempts to enforce SEC no-
action letters, as opposed to attempts to challenge them, 
although a company may attempt to challenge the SEC’s 
decision by refusing to abide by a no-action letter and then 
trying to prove its own interpretation of Rule 14a-8 in court. 
However, if a company were to pursue this strategy, it may 
be unable to rely on previous SEC no-action letters to make 
its arguments. Because the Staff’s advice in no-action letters 
is “informal and nonjudicial in nature, it does not have 
precedential value” and generally cannot be used to 
challenge “identical or similar proposals submitted . . . in the 
future.”73  
2. The Ordinary Business Exclusion 
Rule 14a-8 creates an exclusion for shareholder proposals 
dealing with “ordinary business operations” or decisions that 
company management should make.74 There has been 
significant debate regarding what falls under the ordinary 
business decision exclusion; in fact, the Third Circuit noted 
that the exclusion “has been called the ‘most perplexing’ of 
all the 14a-8 bars.”75 Yet the exclusion served as the grounds 
of decision for 18% of all no-action relief grants in 2013 and 
for 55.9% of all no-action relief grants in 2016.76 The SEC 
 
 
71 Id. at 334. 
72 Amalgamated Clothing, 821 F. Supp. at 879. 
73 Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice 
with Respect to S’holder Proposals, supra note 64, at *5. 
74 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2017). 
75 Trinity Wall St., 792 F.3d at 337. 
76 See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2013 PROXY SEASON 2 (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Shareholder-Proposal 
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makes decisions as to what constitutes “ordinary business” 
on a case-by-case basis.77 Two factors, though not dispositive, 
are regularly considered by the SEC in determining whether 
a proposal falls under ordinary business. First, the Staff 
considers the subject matter of the proposal and asks 
whether the subject relates to ordinary business 
operations.78 Tasks that are “fundamental to management’s 
ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis,” such as “the 
hiring, promotion, and termination of employees, decisions 
on production quality and quantity, and the retention of 
suppliers,” will generally fall within the meaning of 
“ordinary business operations.”79 Second, if the subject 
matter does fall within the ordinary business category, the 
Staff will consider the extent to which the proposal seeks to 
“micromanage” the corporation.80 Micromanagement is 
typically found where a proposal “seeks intricate detail” or 
imposes “specific time-frames or methods for implementing 
complex policies.”81 
Proposals related to ordinary business operations under 
these factors can still survive and appear in proxy materials 
if they are deemed to “include certain matters which have 
significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in 
them.”82 A mere mention of a significant social policy issue is 
 
 
-Developments-2013-Proxy-Season.pdf [https://perma.cc/M34D-PDHF]; see 
also GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 




77 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 61, at 212–13. 
78 Id. at 213. 
79 Trinity Wall St., 792 F.3d at 339–40 (quoting Amendments to Rules 
on Shareholder Proposals, SEC Release Nos. 34-39093, IC-22828, 1997 
SEC LEXIS 1962, at *49 (proposed Sept. 18, 1997)). 
80 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 61, at 213–14. 
81 1997 SEC LEXIS 1962, supra note 79, at *50. 
82 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 
41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) 
(hereinafter 1976 Rule 14a-8 Amendments). 
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normally not enough; the policy issue must “transcend” 
ordinary business operations in order to be considered safe 
from the ordinary business exclusion.83 In contrast, proposals 
referring to ordinary business matters that are “mundane in 
nature” and do not implicate “any substantial policy 
considerations” can almost certainly be omitted from proxy 
materials.84 What the SEC considers a substantial policy 
consideration, however, has evolved with time.85 Proposals 
related to issues that were once excludable under the 
ordinary business exception are non-excludable where the 
social policy issues they raise have become more 
significant.86 For example, issues of whether to close or 
relocate a company facility were once excludable; however, 
the Staff now considers proposals non-excludable where 
there is a focus on studying effects of closing company 
facilities on the surrounding communities.87 
The SEC has historically viewed proposals for pricing 
modifications and structures as part of a company’s 
“management functions,” which could be omitted under 17 
C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(7).88 This has not been true, however, 
within the pharmaceutical industry.89 
 
 
83 Trinity Wall St., 792 F.3d at 341. 
84 1976 Rule 14a-8 Amendments, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998. 
85 Joseph A. Roy, Note, Non-Traditional Activism: Using Shareholder 
Proposals to Urge LGBT Non-Discrimination Protection, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
1513, 1529 (2009). 
86 Reebok Int’l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 55815, at *1 
(Mar. 16, 1992); Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 
285806, at *1 (Jan. 10, 1990); Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 
1989 WL 245523, at *1 (Feb. 2, 1989). 
87 See Pacific Telesis Group, supra note 86, at *1. 
88 See, e.g., UnitedHealth Group Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 
318086, at *17 (Mar. 16, 2011); see also Pacific Telesis Group, supra note 
86, at *1. 
89 See infra Section III.A.1.i. 
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3. The Substantially Implemented Exclusion 
Second, a company may omit a shareholder proposal from 
its proxy statements and annual meeting if it has already 
“substantially implemented” the proposal. According to the 
Commission, this exclusion aims “to avoid the possibility of 
shareholders having to consider matters which have already 
been favorably acted upon by the management.”90 This rule 
served as grounds for 30.9% of all no-action relief grants in 
2016.91 
The Commission’s construction of this rule has evolved 
and broadened over time. In its early use, the Staff only 
granted no-action relief under this exclusion if the company 
had “‘fully effected” the shareholder proposal.92 Later, 
understanding that such a “formalistic application” of the 
exclusion “defeated its purpose” because shareholders could 
introduce proposals that differed by just a few words, the 
Commission revised its interpretation.93 At this point, the 
Commission began interpreting the rule in a way that 
omitted only proposals which had been so “substantially 
implemented” that they should be excluded as moot.94 
More recently, the standard has been whether a 
company’s policies, practices, and procedures “compare 
favorably with the guidelines of the proposal.”95 For a 
company to legally omit a proposal, it must demonstrate that 
 
 
90 See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange 
Act Release No. 12598, 1976 WL 160410, at *9 (July 7, 1976). 
91 See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 2016, supra note 76, at 16. 
92 See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange 
Act Release No. 19135, 1982 WL 600869, at *17 (Oct. 14, 1982). 
93 See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 20091, 1983 WL 33272, at *7 (Aug. 16, 1983). 
94 Id. 
95 See Lowe’s Cos., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 308197, at *2 
(Jan. 29, 2008); Exxon Mobil Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 343257, 
at *1 (Mar. 22, 2016). 
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its actions compare favorably with (a) the shareholder 
proposal’s “underlying concerns” and (b) the shareholder 
proposal’s essential elements.96 The Staff permits differences 
between company action and the action requested in a 
shareholder proposal as long as the company action 
addresses the proposal’s “essential objective.”97  
4. The Resubmission Exclusion 
Third, a company may omit a shareholder proposal if it 
“deals with substantially the same subject matter as another 
proposal . . . [that was] previously included in the company’s 
proxy materials” in the last five calendar years and received 
a sufficiently low vote.98 If there was only one previous 
proposal, the company will exclude a substantially similar 
proposal if the prior proposal received less than 3% of the 
vote at the annual meeting.99 If the subject matter was 
proposed twice within the past five years, a new proposal 
will be omitted if the previous vote garnered less than 6% of 
the vote.100 If the matter was proposed three times, the new 
proposal will only survive if the last submission received at 
least 10% of the vote.101 As a result, every shareholder vote 
on a proxy proposal risks a bar on raising a similar proposal 
for a certain number of years in the future. Thus, the format 




96 See Exelon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 4922472, at *4 
(Feb. 26, 2010). 
97 See Hewlett-Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 4328654, 
at *3 (Dec. 11, 2007). A proposal requesting a shareholder right to call a 
special meeting was substantially implemented by a proposed bylaw 
amendment permitting shareholders to do so unless the board determined 
that the specific issue to be addressed had already been dealt with or 
would soon be considered at an annual meeting. See id. 
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(I)(12) (2017). 
99 Id. § 240.14a-8(I)(12)(i). 
100 Id. § 240.14a-8(I)(12)(ii). 
101 Id. § 240.14a-8(I)(12)(iii). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
A. Shareholder Proposals Within the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Shareholder proposals related to pharmaceutical pricing 
often take one of two forms. First, some proposals directly 
ask a company’s board to adopt a policy of price restraint.102 
For example, a shareholder proposal to Warner-Lambert 
asked the company’s board to “create and implement a policy 
of price restraint on pharmaceutical products for individual 
consumers and institutional purchasers to keep drug prices 
at reasonable levels.”103 Similarly, shareholders submitted a 
proposal to Eli Lilly requesting that the Board “seek input on 
pricing policy from consumer groups, and adopt a policy of 
price restraint . . . .”104 A proposal to Bristol-Myers Squibb 
asked its board to “create and implement a policy of price 
restraint on pharmaceutical products for individual 
customers and institutional purchasers, utilizing a 
combination of approaches to keep drug prices at reasonable 
levels.”105 
A second approach, used with more frequency in recent 
years, asks the board to report on pricing strategies and the 
impact of alleged price gouging on the company’s current and 
long-term financial health. Celgene Corporation’s 
shareholders submitted a proposal asking the board to 
“report to shareholders . . . on the risks to Celgene from 
rising pressure to contain U.S. specialty drug prices.”106 The 
 
 
102 Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *1; Warner-Lambert, supra note 10, at 
*1. 
103 Warner-Lambert, supra note 10, at *7. 
104 Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *4 (emphasis added). 
105 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 223744, 
at *2 (Feb. 21, 2000). 
106 See Celgene Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 42, at 
82 (“Specialty drugs, as defined by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, are those that cost more than $600 per month.”). 
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report was to address the risks created by “public concern 
that U.S. patients and payers are shouldering an excessive 
proportion of the cost burden;” the “[p]rice sensitivity of 
prescribers, payers, and patients;” and the “relationship 
between Celgene’s specialty drug prices and . . . benefit, 
patient access, . . . efficacy and price of alternative therapies, 
manufacturing costs, drug development costs, and the 
proportion of drug development costs borne by academic 
institutions and/or the government.”107 Similarly, the Bristol-
Myers Squibb proposal asked the Board to “report to 
shareholders . . . on changes in policies and pricing 
procedures for pharmaceutical products.”108 A Vertex 
proposal asked for a “report to shareholders . . . at 
reasonable cost and omitting confidential or proprietary 
information, on the risks to Vertex from rising pressure to 
contain U.S. specialty drug prices,” including a focus on 
“price sensitivity of prescribers, payers and patients” and the 
“efficacy and price of alternative therapies, drug 
development costs, and the proportion of those costs borne by 
academic institutions, foundations and/or the 
government.”109 While these particular proposals did not 
receive sufficient votes to pass,110 it should be noted that, 
outside of the pharmaceutical industry, some proposals 
asking for reporting on national, environmental, or social 
issues did manage to achieve majority support in 2016.111 
Using this second approach, shareholder proposals focus 
on obtaining enough information through reporting 




108 Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note 105, at *2. 
109 Vertex Pharmacy Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 109832, at 
*13 (Feb. 25, 2015). 
110 See infra Section III.A.2. 
111 See GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 2016, supra note 76, at 37 (“A 
proposal requesting a report on methane emissions submitted to WPX 
Energy, Inc. received 50.8% of votes cast [and a] proposal requesting a 
sustainability report submitted to CLARCOR Inc. received 60.8% of votes 
cast.”). 
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financial health of the company in light of pricing-related 
business setbacks. Proposals do not have to take only one 
form, and some proposals utilize both approaches in unison, 
such as the Bristol-Myers Squibb proposal.112 
1. SEC Treatment of Fair Pricing Proposals 
i. The Ordinary Business Carve-out for 
“Fundamental Business Strategy” 
The SEC generally finds proposals related to pricing 
modifications and strategies to fall within a company’s 
ordinary business decisions, thus warranting omission by the 
company under the ordinary business exclusion.113 However, 
the Staff has diverged from this trend with regard to pricing 
policies for pharmaceutical products, particularly when 
proposals were framed as national health issues facing the 
pharmaceutical industry and public at large.114 
For example, the Eli Lilly proposal asked the board to 
seek input on its pricing policy from consumer groups and to 
adopt a policy of price restraint.115 This proposal framed 
pricing fairness and restraint as a “crucial national issue” 
and the “key issue facing the pharmaceutical industry.”116 
The Eli Lilly proposal cited evidence from the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, which conducts oversight of the 
administration of major programs such as Medicare and 
evaluates issues related to health and aging, including 
pricing practices for prescription drugs.117 Warner-Lambert 
shareholders also put forth a proposal asking the board to 
 
 
112 Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note 105, at *1–2. 
113 UnitedHealth Group, supra note 88, at *1. 
114 See Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *1; Warner-Lambert, supra note 10, 
at *1. 
115 Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *1. 
116 Id.; see also History, SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING 
http://www.aging.senate.gov/about/history [https://perma.cc/UA35-G92G] 
(last visited June 3, 2017). 
117 See Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *5–6. 
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implement a policy of price restraint on pharmaceutical 
products for individual customers and institutional 
purchasers in order to keep drug prices at reasonable 
levels.118 Upon requests for no-action from the respective 
companies, the SEC found that both proposals went beyond 
ordinary business decisions, going so far as to characterize 
the proposal by Warner-Lambert shareholders as affecting 
the company’s “fundamental business strategy,” and thus 
forced the companies to include the proposals in their proxy 
materials.119 
Definitive interpretation of the phrase “fundamental 
business strategy” is scarce. Holly J. Gregory, Partner at 
Sidley Austin LLP, refers to the rule as a “carveout from the 
ordinary business exclusion to prevent exclusion of the 
proposals relating to pricing policies for the company’s 
products.”120 In Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co,121 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the phrase 
“fundamental business strategy” involved questions of the 
company’s “long-term goals.”122 According to the SEC, “‘when 
a shareholder proposal involves fundamental business 
strategy, long-term goals and economic orientation, the 
subject matter of the proposal would not be considered 
ordinary business subject to the exclusion under Rule 14a-
8(c)(7).’”123 
It is unclear whether the fundamental business strategy 
carve-out applies outside of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Shareholders have used the same line of argument in other 
industries to no avail. But the SEC’s responses do not state 
 
 
118 Warner-Lambert, supra note 10, at *1. 
119 Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *1; Warner-Lambert, supra note 10, at 
*1. 
120 Holly J. Gregory et al., United States, in GETTING THE DEAL 
THROUGH: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2015 236, 246 (Holly J. Gregory ed., 
2015).  
121 958 F.2d 416, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
122 Id. 
123 LISA A. FONTENOT ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND 
COMPENSATION RULES § 12.06 (5th ed. Supp. 2017). 
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why the fundamental business strategy carve-out was not 
applied, and thus the letters have limited value in 
determining what constitutes a fundamental business 
strategy. For example, in 2007, the SEC granted no-action 
relief to Western Union for a proposal related to prices 
charged on the company’s products.124 The Staff did not cite 
its reasoning. However, its decision does comport with 
Western Union’s argument that it is distinguishable from 
the Eli Lilly line of decisions because Western Union’s 
product pricing was not of national importance, while “Eli 
Lilly and Warner-Lambert each dealt with the issue of the 
affordability of prescription drugs, which has been and 
continues to be an issue of great national interest, debate, 
and importance.”125 Thus, it appears that the industry 
distinction rests on a perception of the national controversy 
surrounding pharmaceutical pricing issues. 
A no-action letter issued to an insurance company may 
further demonstrate the Staff’s intent to limit the application 
of the fundamental business strategy carve-out doctrine. In 
2011, the SEC permitted UnitedHealth Group to exclude a 
proposal because the proposal related “to UnitedHealth’s 
ordinary business operations . . . to the manner in which the 
company manages its expenses.”126 In that instance, the 
proposal sought information from the insurance company on 
“how our company is responding to regulatory, legislative 
and public pressures to ensure affordable health care 
coverage and the measures our company is taking to contain 
the price increases of health insurance premiums.”127 This is 
similar to the text of shareholder proposals at 
pharmaceutical companies—for which the Staff denied no-
 
 
124 The Western Union Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 754969, 
at *1 (Mar. 7, 2007). 
125 Id. at *4. 
126 UnitedHealth Group, supra note 88, at *2. 
127 Id. at *26. 
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action relief.128 The Staff’s refusal to allow shareholders of a 
health insurance company to utilize a similar form of 
proposal may indicate an intent to contain the fundamental 
business strategy carve-out not just within the healthcare 
industry, but also specifically to the pharmaceutical 
companies producing and pricing the drugs at issue. 
Yet, the carve-out is not universally applied to all pricing 
proposals at pharmaceutical companies either. The Staff 
granted no-action relief to Johnson & Johnson, permitting 
the company to omit a shareholder proposal that asked the 
board to “review pricing and marketing policies and prepare 
a report on how our company will respond to rising 
regulatory, legislative, and public pressure to increase access 
to and affordability of needed prescription drugs.”129 In 
asking the SEC to allow omission, the company argued that, 
while pharmaceutical pricing on its own may not be 
excludable, “marketing policies” are clearly within the scope 
of the ordinary business exclusion.130 The Staff appears to 
have agreed, finding “some basis” for the view that the 
company could “exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), 
as relating to its ordinary business operations (i.e., 
marketing and public relations).”131 The Johnson & Johnson 
letter may indicate how intentionally and specifically the 
SEC has targeted pharmaceutical pricing, rather than long-
term policies within pharmaceutical companies, despite the 
reference to long-term policies in Roosevelt.132 
To further complicate application of the fundamental 
business strategy carve-out, one letter demonstrates 
application of the carve-out to a shareholder proposal that is 
 
 
128 Gilead Sciences, supra note 45, at *2; Celgene Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, supra note 48, at *1; Eli Lilly, supra note 10, at *1; Warner-
Lambert, supra note 10, at *3. 
129 Johnson & Johnson, SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 103227, at 
*2, *13 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
130 Id. at *9. 
131 Id. at *2. 
132 Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 427 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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both outside of the pharmaceutical industry and unrelated to 
pricing strategy. In 2002, the Staff refused to allow omission 
of a Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) shareholder proposal, 
stating that “the proposal, which relates to the Board of 
Directors’ participation in the development of fundamental 
business strategy and long-term plans, involves issues that 
are beyond matters of PG&E’s ordinary business 
operations.”133 This proposal was unrelated to pricing and 
instead asked for additional disclosure of the company’s long-
term strategic plans, including its “corporate strategy 
development process,” “timelines,” “compliance monitoring 
processes,” and “mechanisms in place to ensure director 
access to pertinent information.”134 
The 2015 proxy season saw a “relatively new topic” of 
shareholder proposals “targeting how pharmaceutical 
companies determine the price of their products”135 in which 
shareholders “asked boards to report on the risks from rising 
pressure to contain U.S. specialty drug prices.”136 During 
that time, companies sought to omit the proposals by seeking 
a no-action letter from SEC Staff under the argument that 
such proposals should still fall under the ordinary business 
exception in Rule 14a-8(i)(7) because “setting the prices for 
products is a decision for management, not shareholders” 
and such proposals seek “to micro-manage the companies” 




133 PG&E Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 253886, at *2 (Jan. 
24, 2002). 
134 Id. at *3. 
135 Keir Gumbs, Shareholder Proposals: Predicting the 2016 Proxy 





137 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2015 PROXY SEASON 14 (2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/Shareholder-
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In response, the SEC has continued to apply the 
fundamental business strategy carve-out within the 
pharmaceutical industry, finding, in line with the decisions 
in the early 1990s, that the proposals focused on 
“fundamental business strategy with respect to its pricing 
policies for pharmaceutical products.”138 For example, in 
response to Gilead’s request for a no-action letter, the SEC 
stated “the proposal focuses on Gilead’s fundamental 
business strategy with respect to its pricing policies for 
pharmaceutical products and does not seek to micromanage 
the company to such a degree that exclusion of the proposal 
would be appropriate.”139 This is in line with the 
Commission’s goal to refuse omissions of proposals involving 
ordinary business decisions that “focus[] on sufficiently 
significant policy issues.”140 
ii. Issues with Resubmission 
Particularly within the realm of pharmaceutical pricing 
proposals, which have historically received a low percentage 
of votes,141 the resubmission exclusion means that the stakes 
are high for each shareholder proposal. One shareholder’s 
failure to garner sufficient support could rob all shareholders 
of their chance to put forth similar proposals for the 
following five years, so any proposal that is voted on must be 
successful enough to avoid sacrificing future proposals.142 For 
example, in 2004 the SEC supported Bristol-Myers Squibb 






139 Gilead Sciences, supra note 45, at *2 (emphasis added). 
140 See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange 
Act Release No. 40018, Investment Company Act Release No. 23200, 67 
SEC Docket 373 (May 21, 1998). 
141 See infra Section III.A.2. 
142 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12) (2017); see also infra Section 
III.B.1.ii. 
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proposals.143 One proposal, put forth by a pension plan 
provider, asked the board to “develop a policy of price 
restraint on prescription pharmaceutical products.”144 
Another, put forth by the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (“ICCR”), called for the board to review 
pricing policies and report on how the company “will respond 
to rising regulatory, legislative and public pressure to 
increase access to and affordability of needed prescription 
drugs.”145 Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that the pension and 
ICCR proposals dealt with substantially the same subject 
matter as three other proposals voted on within the prior 
four years. Two had requested that the board create and 
implement a policy of price restraint “to keep drug prices at 
reasonable levels” and report to shareholders on changes in 
pricing policies.146 The third had asked the board to report to 
shareholders on the creation and implementation of a policy 
of price restraints on prescription drugs “to keep drug prices 
at reasonable levels.”147 The latter proposal was the most 
recently voted on, and it failed to receive the threshold of 
10% votes required for resubmission of a fourth, similar 
proposal within the allotted timeframe.148 As a result, the 
SEC granted no-action letter relief to Bristol-Myers Squibb 
and the proposals were omitted.149 
The proposals excluded in Bristol-Myers Squibb were not 
identical to the proposals that served as the grounds for their 
exclusion under the resubmission rule.150 In particular, the 
 
 
143 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 299070, 
at *3 (Feb. 11, 2004). 
144 Id. at *5. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at *1. 
147 Id. at *7. 
148 Id. at *5. The most recent 2002 proposal received 3.5% of the votes, 
falling under Rule 14a-8(i)(12)(iii), which requires that the proposal 
receive 10% of votes cast in order for a similar proposal to be introduced 
within three subsequent years. See id. 
149 Id. at *1. 
150 Id. 
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proposal by ICCR diverged from the previous proposals 
(which sought policies of price restraint and follow-up 
reporting on such changes) in asking for a report on the 
company’s response to regulatory and legislative pressure 
related to drug access and affordability issues.151 It appears 
that the similar nature of the proposals—a focus on the 
company’s pricing policies—was sufficient to justify 
exclusion. This further underscores the importance of 
meeting threshold voting levels, as a failure to do so may 
impact all shareholder proposals of a similar sentiment even 
if future proposals include new components or ask for 
something different. 
iii. Company Opposition and Substantial 
Implementation 
Companies often argue that product pricing is a daily 
function of management, thus falling under the ordinary 
business exclusion.152 With regard to proposals calling for 
fair pricing analyses and reporting, some companies argue 
that such information is already contained in their disclosure 
materials and thus the proposals have already been 
substantially implemented. For example, with regard to a 
proposal seeking reports on the effect of unfair pricing on the 
company, Celgene pointed to disclosures in its 10-Q 
regarding “material risks created by competition, regulation 
and limits on reimbursements for its products” in order to 
argue that the proposal had already been substantially 
implemented.153 
Asking the SEC for a no-action letter is inherently risky 
for companies, as they face mandatory inclusion in their 
proxy statements if the Staff does not agree with their 
interpretation and shareholders successfully sue to enjoin 
 
 
151 Id. at *2, 5. 
152 See Gilead Sciences, supra note 45, at *17; Vertex Pharmacy, 
supra note 109, at *14–15; Celgene Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra 
note 48, at *12 . 
153 Celgene Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 48, at *5. 
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the company from excluding it. As a result, some companies 
try to extinguish shareholder proposals before the annual 
meeting through negotiations with the shareholder 
sponsoring the proposal.154 Such negotiations can result in 
agreed-upon implementation of some aspects of the proposal, 
leading the shareholder to withdraw the proposal before any 
votes are cast.155 
Where negotiations are ineffective or not attempted, 
many pharmaceutical companies circulate proxy voting 
policies instructing shareholders to vote against 
pharmaceutical price restraint on the contention that such 
pricing is integral to their company and should not be 
dictated by shareholders.156 In the past, proxy guidelines 
buttressed these contentions. Recently, however, many proxy 
guidelines have indicated a willingness to compromise by 
advocating votes in favor of, or a case-by-case evaluation of, 
price reporting and disclosure, so long as it does not pose 
competitive or investment related risks.157 
 
 
154 See supra Section II.C.3. 
155 See infra Section III.A.3. 
156 See GLASS LEWIS, PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2016 PROXY SEASON 19 
(2016), http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016_Guide 
lines_SHAREHOLDER-INITIATIVES-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4P2G6U 
R]; INST’L S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 55 (2014), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2015ussummaryvoting 
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG5D-CTDC]; DEUTSCHE BANK AG, PROXY 
VOTING POLICY AND GUIDELINES 27, https://www.db.com/cr/img/ 
Proxy_Voting_Policy_and_Guidelines_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5BM-
7MBX]. 
157 Id.; AB GLOBAL, PROXY VOTING POLICY 17 (2015), 
https://www.abglobal.com/abcom/our_firm/content/cgdocs/ab_proxy_voting
_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9DC-4H35]; see also infra Section III.B.2. 
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2. Proposal Voting Results and Accompanying 
Correlations 
Recent shareholder proposals that sought reporting on 
the risks of high pricing of specialty drugs did not pass.158 
Table 1 shows the voting results on three such proposals 
from the 2015 proxy season: 
 
TABLE 1. VOTING RESULTS REGARDING 2015 
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS RELATED TO PRICING OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
 
 Gilead159 Vertex160 Celgene161 
Votes For 208,355,366 6,283,460 31,210,063 
Votes Against 676,700,065 179,710,139 480,827,972 
Abstentions 230,987,125 30,663,973 74,372,497 
Broker Non-Voters 160,034,367 6,077,182 112,211,797 
% Votes Cast “For” 23.5% 3.4% 6.1% 
 
The Gilead Sciences proposal, while not garnering a 
majority of votes, received a significantly higher percentage 
of “for” votes than did the Vertex and Celgene proposals, 
with 23.5% of all votes cast being in favor of the Gilead 
proposal, as opposed to 3.4% and 6.1% for Vertex and 
Celgene, respectively.162 Events leading up to Gilead’s 
annual meeting showed that high involvement by the 
proponent shareholder correlated with a more successful 
vote. The proponent of Gilead’s shareholder proposal, UAW, 
sent a series of letters to shareholders leading up to the 
 
 
158 Gilead Sciences, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2015); 
Vertex Pharmacy, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) (June 4, 2015); 
Celgene Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) (June 18, 2015). 
159 Gilead Sciences, Quarterly Report, supra note 158. 
160 Vertex Pharmacy, Quarterly Report, supra note 158. 
161 Celgene Corp., Quarterly Report, supra note 158. 
162 See supra Table 1. 
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annual meeting.163 On April 16, three weeks before the 
annual meeting, UAW sent a letter to shareholders outlining 
the need for increased transparency around Gilead’s drug 
prices.164 UAW contended that Gilead’s stock price had fallen 
by 17% after a large pharmacy benefit manager announced 
that it would no longer cover some of Gilead’s high-priced 
products, and that increased transparency of drug pricing 
strategies and attendant risks would allow investors to 
understand “if and how the board fully considered the risks” 
of their drug pricing.165 On April 28, one week before the 
annual meeting, UAW notified shareholders that 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), an influential 
proxy advisory firm, was supporting the shareholder 
proposal.166 The letter also stated that the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee “launched an investigation into Gilead’s 
pricing of Sovaldi” and that such controversy had already 
impacted Gilead’s performance through a loss in stock 
price.167 The following day, UAW followed up with another 
letter that outlined the rationale behind the proposal and 
addressed potential shareholder questions.168 
 
 
163 See Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Form PX14A6G) (Apr. 16, 2015); Gilead 
Sciences, Inc. (Form PX14A6G) (Apr. 28, 2015). 
164 Gilead Sciences (Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 163. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (informing shareholders that ISS was endorsing the 
shareholder proposal and added that, in support, ISS stated that the high 
costs of the drug, the disparity between the amount that Gilead charges in 
the United States versus in developing countries, and the high prevalence 
of individuals in the United States that are infected with HCV, many of 
whom rely on government benefits, has drawn a substantial volume of 
adverse media attention, two U.S. Senate investigations, and on-going 
class action litigation against the company); see also infra Section III.B.2 
(addressing the role and importance of proxy advisory firms such as ISS). 
167 Gilead Sciences (Apr. 28, 2015), supra note 163 (alleging that 
regulators were investigating Gilead’s pricing on a number of its products 
and noting that such controversy had already affected Gilead’s stock price 
by 17%). 
168 See Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Form PX14A6G) (Apr. 29, 2015) 
(addressing the purpose of the proposal and noting that the proposal 
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The Celgene and Vertex proposals, in contrast, do not 
demonstrate significant activity on the part of the 
shareholder putting forth the proposal. In both cases, UAW 
came in at a later stage and “sponsored” the proposals, in 
each instance submitting a letter to the shareholders 
announcing its sponsorship.169 However, UAW was not the 
proponent in either case, did not obtain ISS support, and did 
not provide multiple letters.170 
3. Positive Impacts of Unsuccessful Proposals 
As evidenced above, price-restraint proposals are an 
uphill battle for proponents.171 Yet, shareholders pursuing 
such initiatives can use proposals to send a message to 
management and create pressure surrounding price hikes.172 
Instead of pursuing a no-action letter from the SEC, 
management can choose to negotiate with the proponent 
shareholder to convince the shareholder to withdraw his or 
her proposal in light of changes that the company agrees to 
make.173 This will often occur when “the management team 
wants to avoid negative publicity or an adverse vote result at 
the [annual meeting],”174 and because of the impending 
meeting, a proposal “can fast-track dialogue for the simple 
 
 
would not require Gilead to reveal confidential or proprietary 
information). 
169 Vertex Pharmacy, Inc. (Form PX14A6G) (May 15, 2015); Celgene 
Corp. (Form Px14A6G) (June 1, 2015). 
170 Id. 
171 See supra Section III.A.2. 
172 See Peter Loftus, Pfizer Share News, ADVFN, http://www.advfn. 
com/nyse/StockNews.asp?stocknews=PFE&article=47114100 [https://per 
ma.cc/6SES-VQXK] (last visited June 3, 2017). 
173 Giovanna Michelon & Michelle Rodrigue, Demand for CSR: 
Insights from Shareholder Proposals, 35 SOC. & ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY J. 
157, 159 (2015). 
174 DB Advisors, Corporate Engagement by Institutional Shareholders, 
DEUTSCHE BANK GROUP 4 (2013) https://www.db.com/cr/en/ 
docs/DB_Climate_Change_Advisors_-_Corporate_Engagement_Studie_(en) 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y37J-XMAJ]. 
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reason that the clock is set for directors to respond with 
specificity prior to [the] meeting.”175 Because management is 
negotiating from a defensive standpoint, “most activist 
shareholders consider managers to be the most responsive to 
proposals when they negotiate a withdrawal, rather than 
allowing a vote.”176 As a result, the “ultimate value” of a 
shareholder proposal may not lie in its “short-term voting 
results,” but in its long-term ability to “bring about changes 
in corporations through dialogue, a reassessment of their 
challenged activities and/or industry spillover effects.”177 
Withdrawn proposals, which represent approximately 20% of 
all shareholder proposals each year, reflect “success for 
shareholders because their request has been partially or 
fully implemented.”178 
Similarly, if the company wishes to exclude the proposal 
but is not comfortable relying on withdrawal, the substantial 
implementation exclusion allows companies to take small 
steps to partially implement proposals in order to avoid 
mandatory inclusion in their proxy materials. For example, 
UAW submitted shareholder proposals to six pharmaceutical 
companies requesting that the companies prepare reports on 
and explanations for “specialty drugs” costing more than 
$600 per month.179 Of those six proposals, three companies 
implemented “at least some aspects of the proposals”180 in 
order to fall under this exclusion. 
 
 
175 Gianna McCarthy & Eric Shostal, Shareholder Resolutions and 
Constructive Dialogue, in 21ST CENTURY ENGAGEMENT: INVESTOR 
STRATEGIES FOR INCORPORATING ESG CONSIDERATIONS INTO CORPORATE 
INTERACTIONS 16 (2015), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-
hu/literature/publication/blk-ceres-engagementguide2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/65YK-DJRF]. 
176 Michelon & Rodrigue, supra note 173, at 160. 
177 Id. 
178 DB Advisors, supra note 174, at 4. 
179 See Ising, supra note 137. 
180 Id. 
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B. The Role of Institutions 
1. Institutional Investors’ Growth in Power and 
Responsibility 
As more American families have tapped into capital 
markets through pooled-investment vehicles, the role and 
influence of institutional investors has grown.181 In fact, the 
SEC Commissioner has now framed institutional investors 
as “dominant market players”182 who help “improve price 
discovery, increase allocative efficiency, and promote 
management accountability.”183 Much of this power stems 
from the fact that institutional investors often control large 
pools of assets that belong to others, which they can wield as 
a cohesive voting unit.184 
Being able to marshal large voting blocs makes 
institutional investors important to the outcome of proposals 
that are voted on at annual meetings. The pressure exerted 
by shareholder proposals that make it to the voting stage 
may be stronger where institutional investors are active 
proponents. For example, though Gilead defeated the 2015 
proposal (asking for annual reports on the risks of its pricing 
policy),185 the company voluntarily adopted a similar 
 
 
181 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Institutional 






185 Specifically, the resolutions sought information regarding “drug 
development costs; relationships between pricing, clinical benefits and 
patient access; price disparities between the U.S. and other countries; 
price sensitivity of payers and patients; and whether payers are 
increasingly likely to use cost-effectiveness techniques to make 
reimbursement decisions.” Ed Silverman, Gilead and Vertex Shareholders 
Can Vote on Pricing Resolutions: SEC, WALL. ST. J.: PHARMALOT (Mar. 12, 
2015, 11:09 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/03/12/gilead-and-
vertex-shareholders-can-vote-on-pricing-resolutions-sec 
[https://perma.cc/9XH9-RK7N]. 
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reporting procedure the following year.186 The fact that 
23.5% of votes cast were “for” the proposal may have 
pressured the company to implement similar policies, and 
the active involvement of a large institutional shareholder 
(UAW) probably helped achieve that voting result.187 
Where institutional investors own large percentages of a 
firm’s outstanding shares, they may “threaten to sell” their 
stake if the company does not implement policies that 
received significant, if not majority, support.188 The sale of a 
sufficiently large ownership stake would adversely impact 
the company’s stock price and, therefore, could adversely 
affect executive compensation through stock options.189 Thus, 
the involvement of a large institutional investor can put 
pressure on directors and officers in a way that individual 
shareholders holding smaller stakes often cannot. 
Similarly, institutional investors can exert significant 
pressure on companies during the negotiation phase, 
between the filing of a shareholder proposal and the annual 
meeting. If withdrawal is considered a sign of shareholder 
success,190 then the frequency of withdrawal sheds some 
light on how successful proponent shareholders are during 
negotiations. One study shows that proposal sponsorship by 
institutional investors is positively correlated with a 
proposal’s withdrawal likelihood, finding that 42.4% of 
Corporate Social Responsibility proposals filed by 
institutional investors and 33% of those filed by unions were 
withdrawn,191 while only 4.4% of those filed by individual 
investors were withdrawn.192 The disparity in withdrawal 
 
 
186 See Barkholz, supra note 43. 
187 See supra Section III.A.2. 
188 DB Advisors, supra note 174, at 4. 
189 Id. at 22. 
190 “The most powerful proposal type: Withdrawn shareholder 
proposals.” Id. 
191 Rob Bauer et al., Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals and Does 
It Matter? An Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. 
GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 472, 478 (2015). 
192 Id. 
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percentage demonstrates that individual investors are less 
able to negotiate change with the company than are 
institutional investors, either because the individuals are 
ineffective during negotiations or because they are unable to 
get a seat at the bargaining table in the first place. 
In addition to institutional investors often having large 
ownership stakes, they also tend to wield power through 
their ability to communicate their agenda outside of the 
private negotiation setting. This involves making their 
proposal’s subject and supporting evidence known by a wider 
audience, including circulating materials to other 
shareholders and communicating with the media.193 
However, this additional step of circulating materials 
involves an extra cost to the proposal sponsor194—including 
legal fees, proxy solicitation fees, and advertising and public 
relations expenses195—which may be another reason that 
institutional investors, rather than individuals, are better 
positioned to successfully leverage proposals. 
2. The Importance of Proxy Advisory Firms 
Another set of “important players” are proxy advisory 
firms, which counsel shareholders on how to vote their 
shares on issues of corporate governance and corporate 
responsibility at annual meetings.196 SEC commissioner 
Michael Piwowar stated that proxy advisory firms exercised 
 
 
193 DB Advisors, supra note 174, at 5. 
194 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 61, at 208. One of the benefits of 
Rule 14a-8 from a shareholder prospective is low cost, as the company will 
circulate proxy materials to shareholders with the proposal included. 
Thus, the fact that additional money may need to be spent to circulate 
additional materials in order to increase probability of success may 
undermine one of the goals of the rule. 
195 Michael Levin, Exempt Proxy Solicitations, ACTIVIST INVESTOR, 
http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Exempt_Solicita
tions.html [https://perma.cc/5DEL-FT5S] (last visited June 3, 2017). 
196 Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: 
Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design, 29 REV. FIN. STUDIES 
3394, 3395 (2016). 
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“outsized influence on shareholder voting.”197 Yet it should be 
noted that some debate remains as to the importance of 
proxy advisory firm policies and whether their 
recommendations cause voting changes or simply correlate 
with certain voting outcomes.198 
The two most prominent proxy advisory firms are ISS and 
Glass Lewis.199 One study finds that there is a strong 
correlation between ISS’s recommendations and voting 
outcomes.200 In the past, both firms encouraged shareholders 
to vote against proposals calling for any kind of price 
restraint or price reporting; however, ISS and Glass Lewis 
have since transitioned to a “case-by-case” evaluation of 
proposals asking for product pricing or medicine access 
reports and a recommendation to “vote for” reports on the 
financial and legal impacts of drug policies.201 In 2016, ISS 
updated its proxy guidelines again, making two changes to 
its factors of consideration for determining voting advice on 
pharmaceutical pricing proposals.202 First, ISS added 
 
 
197 Michael S. Piwowar, Address at the 2013 SEC Proxy Advisory 
Firms Roundtable (Dec. 5, 2013). https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-
advisory-services/proxy-advisory-services-transcript.txt 
[https://perma.cc/6FRV-4TMR]. 
198 See Malenko & Shen, supra note 196, at 3395–96. 
199 Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, Proxy Advisory Firms: The 
Economics of Selling Information to Voters 5 (unpublished manuscript) 
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2757597. ISS controls 61% of the market and Glass Lewis controls 36% of 
the market, with other proxy advisory firms having a much smaller 
market share. See id.  
200 Id. at 2. 
201 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, UNITED STATES SUMMARY 
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2016 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
58–59 (2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/2016-us-summary-
voting-guidelines-dec-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5MW-U877]. As of this 
release, ISS still recommended voting against proposals asking companies 
to implement specific price restraints unless the company was failing to 
adhere to legislative guidelines or industry norms in its practices. See id. 
202 Trevor G. Pinkerton, 2016 Proxy Guidelines Update from ISS and 
Glass Lewis, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (2015), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ knowledge/publications/134883/2016-
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“regulatory risk” to its description of risk exposure (where 
previously only reputational and market risk were 
considered).203 Second, ISS called for disclosure of policies 
related to “recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines 
at the company.”204 These modifications are “meant to reflect 
the increased criticism regarding the pricing of 
pharmaceutical products, especially in regards to specialty 
drugs.”205 With regard to proposals that go beyond reporting 
and ask for policy changes, ISS recommends voting against—
unless the company is failing to adhere to “legislative 
guidelines or industry norms in its product pricing 
practices.”206 This clause demonstrates that ISS considers 
how a company’s product pricing compares to others in the 
industry. Glass Lewis’ policy, while still advocating a case-
by-case evaluation, says the firm will “consider supporting 
proposals in cases where proponents have clearly 
demonstrated that a company’s current practices or policies 
present significant financial or reputational harm.”207 These 
shifts demonstrate an openness on the part of proxy advisory 
firms to advocate for shareholder proposals that seek pricing 
restraint and impact reporting, which has the potential to 
cause—or correlate with—an uptick in “for” votes and may 





203 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, supra note 201, at 58. 
204 Id. at 59. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 58. 
207 Pinkerton, supra note 202; GLASS LEWIS, 2017 PROXY PAPER 
GUIDELINES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY 
ADVICE, SHAREHOLDER INITIATIVES 20 (2016), http://www.glasslewis.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_Shareholder_Initiatives.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LYD8-KXT9].  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. The SEC Should Continue to Include 
Pharmaceutical Pricing Proposals 
The SEC should not modify its approach to evaluating 
pharmaceutical pricing proposals and price impact report 
proposals. When evaluating proposals asking for reports, the 
Staff will evaluate the underlying subject of the report. For 
example, it will “consider whether the subject matter of the 
[requested] report or [study] committee involves a matter of 
ordinary business: where it does, the proposal [is] excludable 
under Rule 14a–8(c)(7).”208 Given the Staff’s history of 
finding pricing of pharmaceutical drugs to fall outside of the 
ordinary business exclusion due to social policy issues, 
shareholder proposals that ask pharmaceutical companies to 
evaluate the effect of their pricing strategies on long-term 
product prospects should continue to pass no-action letter 
scrutiny, so long as they do not incorporate other reporting 
or policy requirements within the same proposal. 
Whether proposals directly asking companies to 
implement policies of price restraint will continue to be 
included in proxy materials is somewhat less clear. Since the 
Warner-Lambert and Eli Lilly shareholder proposals in 
1993, the SEC’s stance has not been tested by a second wave 
of proposals directly asking companies to implement a new 
pricing strategy. The closest is a proposal to Bristol-Myers 
Squibb in 2000, asking the board to “[c]reate and implement 
a policy of price restraint on pharmaceutical products . . . 
utilizing a combination of approaches to keep drug prices at 
reasonable levels . . . [and r]eport to shareholders . . . on 
changes in policies and pricing procedures.”209 In that 
 
 
208 Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 
20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218, 38,221 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 240); see also Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 
416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
209 Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note 105, at *3. 
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instance, the SEC refused to grant no-action relief to the 
company, finding that the proposal “relates to Bristol-Myers’ 
fundamental business strategy, i.e., its pricing policy for 
pharmaceutical products.”210 While the SEC is not legally 
bound by prior letters, it should continue to apply the 
fundamental business strategy carve-out in a way that is 
consistent with prior decisions.211 Though untested in recent 
years, this should allow proposals for changes in pricing 
policy to survive companies’ exclusion attempts. While such 
proposals are not likely to obtain majority voting support at 
this time,212 the pressure they create may bolster 
institutional investor arguments at the bargaining table 
between filing and the annual meeting.213 
To improve likelihood of inclusion, sponsors should 
carefully tailor the text of their proposals. To take advantage 
of the fundamental business strategy carve-out under the 
ordinary business exclusion, a proposal’s scope should be 
limited to pricing policies (e.g., implementation of new 
pricing policies or reports about impacts of existing pricing 
policies).214 Sponsors should avoid—or work with a 
cooperating shareholder to separately propose—diversions 
into other areas that may seem to be related, such as the 
marketing of high-priced products, in order to maximize the 
probability of inclusion.215 
 
 
210 Id. at *2. 
211 SEC no-action letters are not binding precedent for future 
decisions; see supra Section II.C.1. 
212 See supra Section III.A.2 (demonstrating that shareholder 
proposals related to pharmaceutical pricing often fail to receive a majority 
vote). 
213 See supra Section III.B.1 (noting that institutional investors may 
have strong bargaining power between filing and the annual meeting, 
when management of the firm often seeks to exclude the proposal by 
negotiating a withdrawal). 
214 See supra Section III.A.1.i. 
215 Id. 
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B. Institutional Investors Must Take Action 
As long as the SEC’s stance on pharmaceutical pricing 
policies remains the same, shareholders have an opportunity 
to pressure pharmaceutical companies to implement more 
reasonable pricing policies. Shareholders should consider a 
proposal to be successful if it meets any of the following three 
criteria: first, if it garners sufficient support to obtain a 
majority vote at the annual meeting;216 second, if it garners 
enough support at the annual meeting to send a strong 
signal to management and provide leverage for proponent 
shareholders to rely upon after the meeting, even if a 
majority was not obtained;217 and third, if the proponent 
ultimately withdraws the proposal as the result of a 
satisfactory negotiation with the company, through which 
the proponent obtains at least some implementation of their 
essential objectives.218 While the latter two measures of 
success do not result in a passing vote, they have been shown 
to be effective in causing a company to make policy 
changes.219 
Yet, a successful proposal—regardless of whether success 
is measured by some threshold of votes-in-favor or 
negotiated proposal withdrawal—likely requires significant 
involvement by an institutional shareholder.220 UAW’s 
 
 
216 See supra Section III.A.2 
217 See supra Section III.A.3 (showing the positive impacts post-
meeting where the proposal had strong support, even though not from a 
majority); see also supra Section III.B.1 (indicating that institutional 
investors may rely on that support in pressuring the company to make 
changes after the annual meeting). 
218 See supra Section III.A.3 (discussing the perceived success where a 
proposal was withdrawn and the widespread practice of negotiating with 
institutional shareholders between filing of the proposal and the annual 
meeting). 
219 Id. 
220 See supra Section III.A.2 (demonstrating that active engagement 
by an institutional shareholder correlates with a stronger vote result); see 
also supra Section III.B.1 (institutional investors wield significant power 
to gather shareholder votes and negotiate with the board). 
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noticeably high vote with the Gilead proposal demonstrates 
this correlation.221 In order to retain the SEC-created 
opportunity to pressure boards on their drug pricing 
strategies, proponent shareholders must ensure that their 
proposals obtain enough votes to protect future proposals 
from the resubmission ban.222 This requires proponents to 
engage with other shareholders to demonstrate their 
reasoning, which is time-consuming and expensive.223 Thus, 
sponsors of fair pricing proposals should remain active after 
filing and finance the wide distribution of supporting 
materials between the filing and the annual meeting. Only a 
limited number of individual shareholders who are active in 
using Rule 14a-8 could likely finance the costs of such 
widespread distribution. For example, Evelyn Davis and 
John Chevedden utilize this mechanism.224 Yet, they may not 
carry the same reputational value that a large institution 
carries—in fact, in some instances, being so well known for 
putting forth shareholder proposals as an individual may 
hurt their ability to sway other shareholders. These 
individuals also may not have the same access to media. The 
parties best suited to step up to the shareholder proposal 
plate on pharmaceutical pricing are the institutional 
investors with money to spend on distribution of letters and 
supporting materials. 
The pool of institutional shareholders whose interests 
align on such issues may grow as the financial industry 
begins to recognize the adverse effects that high-priced 
 
 
221 See supra Section III.A.2. 
222 See supra Section II.C.4 (explaining how the resubmission ban 
functions); see also supra Section III.A.1.ii (identifying instances of the 
resubmission ban being used to bar pharmaceutical pricing proposals). 
223 See supra Section III.A.1.ii. 
224 See Richard Jerome, Evelyn Y. Davis, PEOPLE (May 20, 1996, 12:00 
PM), http://people.com/archive/evelyn-y-davis-vol-45-no-20 
[https://perma.cc/G4KK-N7YK]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Grappling with 
the Cost of Corporate Gadflies, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:02 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/grappling-with-the-cost-of- 
corporate-gadflies/?r=0 [https://perma.cc/4R7J-QZXW]. 
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pharmaceuticals can have on the overall value of their 
investment.225 This is underscored by the advice given by 
proxy advisory institutions, encouraging shareholders to 
conduct case-by-case evaluations of pricing restraint 
proposals rather than abiding by a blanket policy of voting 
against such proposals.226 
While some individuals and institutional investors may 
be able to garner enough votes to keep future proposals from 
the resubmission graveyard, the ultimate goal is not to 
survive a resubmission ban. In order to force boards to 
consider changes to their drug pricing strategies or report on 
the impacts of those strategies, proponent shareholders 
would also be wise to engage directly with the board. On this 
front, institutional shareholders have dramatically more 
success than individuals.227 Labor unions, pension funds, and 
other forms of large-scale investors are able to put the 
weight of their stock holdings behind the proposal, risking a 
stock slump that would impact the company’s perceived 
value as well as the actual value of compensation for many 
members of the board. This puts institutional investors in a 
strong position to be heard. 
C. Proponents Should Utilize Historical Proposal 
Forms and Consider New Forms 
As discussed above, shareholder proposals related to 
pharmaceutical pricing often take one of two forms.228 
Recently, shareholders have favored proposals for reporting 
on the impacts and risks of the company’s pricing strategies, 
but historically, the SEC has also required inclusion of 
proposals for actual changes to pricing policies.229 Yet, SEC 
rules only allow a shareholder to put forth one proposal per 
 
 
225 See supra Section II.B. 
226 See supra Section III.B.2. 
227 See supra Section III.B.1 (showing the difference in negotiated 
withdrawals between institutional investors and individuals). 
228 See supra Section III.A. 
229 Id. 
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annual meeting.230 Thus, when institutional investors decide 
to take action, they will have to choose whether to utilize one 
approach in particular, combine them, or create a new form. 
Because proposals requesting actual price changes would 
demand more from the company than a report on pricing 
impacts, a proposal for actual change may present a stronger 
front and yield more bargaining power for its proponent. On 
the other hand, there are valid reasons why an investor 
should prefer a reporting proposal. First, while there is 
evidence that pharmaceutical price gouging can have a 
negative long-term impact on a company’s stock price,231 
investors should hesitate to directly request price changes 
without confirmation that such a risk is present in their own 
investment. When the presence of such a risk is 
unconfirmed, institutional investors should begin by putting 
forth a reporting proposal, signaling to management that the 
shareholder is probing the impact of drug prices on the 
company’s financial health, without committing to a public 
request for price changes. For a similar reason, if the 
shareholder intends for the proposal to be voted on at the 
annual meeting,232 a reporting proposal may result in a 
stronger vote because it provides a gentler and more 
defensible on-ramp for shareholders whose votes the 
proponent seeks. 
Yet, because the SEC has historically considered price 
change proposals to fall within the “fundamental business 
strategy” carve-out from the ordinary business exclusion,233 
institutional investors should also consider using that form 
of proposal. This is particularly true for institutional 
investors who have already concluded that the company’s 
 
 
230 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (2017). 
231 See supra Section II.B. 
232 Many institutional investors wield strong power during the 
negotiation phase between filing the proposal and the annual meeting, and 
thus those intending to negotiate a withdrawal may have no intention of 
bringing their proposal to a vote at the annual meeting. See supra Section 
III.B.1. 
233 See supra Section III.A.1.i. 
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pricing policies are risky or depressing stock value—a 
conclusion which may or may not be the result of a previous 
year’s reporting proposal. This approach should also be 
considered by an institution with significant bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the company—either because the investor 
holds a significant portion of the company’s outstanding 
stock or because the investor represents a coalition of 
stockholders whose holdings represent such a portion in 
combination. A proposal that requests price changes may 
further buttress such a shareholder’s bargaining power 
because support for such a proposal demonstrates a 
commitment not just to investigate the impact of 
pharmaceutical prices, but to change them. 
In addition to reporting and price change proposals, 
shareholders should also consider methods for tying 
executive compensation to future setbacks the company may 
face on account of its product pricing. A group of thirteen 
institutional investors recently collaborated with BlackRock 
to “develop a set of internal executive compensation policies 
to ‘claw back’ pay in the event of fraudulent activities or 
misconduct.”234 A similar formulation could be used to draft 
shareholder proposals for claw-back provisions, which could, 
for example, claw back compensation in the event that a 
pharmaceutical product is denied insurance coverage due to 
its price. Such a proposal should be strongly considered by 
shareholders of companies whose executives receive sizable, 
one-time bonuses upon federal approval of a drug or upon 
the drug beginning to make a profit. For example, in 2015, 
Vertex senior executives were set to reap more than $53 
million in one-time bonuses once the company’s new cystic 
fibrosis drug began turning a profit.235 If that bonus had 
been linked to insurance coverage through a claw-back 
 
 
234 See McCarthy & Shostal, supra note 175, at 16. 
235 Robert Weisman, Cystic Fibrosis Drug Could Bring Millions to 
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provision, a subsequent cost-related denial of coverage by 
any state’s Medicaid program could have forced executives to 
return money to the company. Institutional investors should 
consider using shareholder proposals to push for 
implementation of such claw-back provisions in order to 
incentivize executive restraint in determining drug pricing 
policies. In a similar vein, proposals could request that 
executive stock options vest with a longer time-horizon so 
that executives making drug pricing decisions are forced to 
consider longer-term effects on their compensation packages 
and bear the risk that their pricing decisions may impact 
stock prices in the future. Focusing a shareholder proposal 
on executive compensation may remedy investor hesitation 
to ask for specific price changes while tying the pressure to 
contain pharmaceutical prices directly to the way senior 
executives are paid. 
D. Individuals Wishing to Advocate Through 
Shareholder Proposals Should Focus Efforts on 
Pension Funds 
While institutional investors are best situated to leverage 
shareholder proposals, their willingness to do so depends on 
the motivations of their decision-makers. Despite some 
evidence that surging prices have a negative long-term 
impact on the financial health of their pharmaceutical 
investment,236 hesitant investors may still require a push in 
the right direction. Individuals who want these investors to 
take action should therefore consider using political pressure 
to encourage those entities. 
Of institutional investors, pension plans may be most 
susceptible to this approach because many of their board 
members, such as appointed and ex-officio trustees, are 
exposed to political forces.237 Appointed trustees are 
 
 
236 See supra Section II.B. 
237 David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund 
Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and 
Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 196–97 (2005). 
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generally chosen by governors or legislatures, while ex-officio 
trustees serve on the board because of holding a particular 
public office, such as state controller.238 Appointed trustees 
are exposed to outside political pressure from the person who 
appointed them, knowing they could be removed and 
replaced if desired.239 Ex-officio trustees are directly exposed 
to political pressure from constituents and others in their 
party.240 
Yet, even for plans with a high percentage of politically 
affiliated trustees, the fund’s solvency will impact its 
willingness to advocate for lower pharmaceutical prices. A 
pension plan calculates its payment obligations in advance, 
and its Funding Ratio measures its ability to meet those 
obligations.241 An under-funded plan will be forced to 
compete with other government projects for additional 
contributions from the state government. Therefore, under-
funded pension plans have an incentive to increase their 
Funding Ratio by maximizing short-term profit.242 As a 
result, pension plans with Funding Ratios at or above 100% 
are more likely to have enough of a financial buffer to take a 
long-term view and forego some short-term profits. 
Thus, the most immediately appropriate advocates for 
pharmaceutical pricing proposals may be solvent pension 
plans with a high percentage of politically affiliated trustees. 
Table 2 measures some of the nation’s largest pension plans 
on both of these criteria.243 The plans are depicted vertically 
by level of political susceptibility, measured by the 
 
 
238 Id. at 196. 
239 Governors and other parties who appoint trustees for pension fund 
boards may have the ability to remove their appointed trustees at any 
time. For example, “the Governor of California removed four appointed 
trustees from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System’s 
(“CalSTERS”) board after they voted to oppose his proposal to reform the 
public pension fund.” Id. at 197. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 192–93. 
242 Id. at 193. 
243 See infra Appendix A for the data behind Table 2. 
GOEMAN – FINAL  
800 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
percentage of each institution’s board that holds a 
trusteeship ex-officio or as an appointed trustee.244 The plans 





244 For political susceptibility, unless noted as an exception, see NAT’L 
ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, COMPOSITION OF PUB. RET. SYS. BDS. (2016), 
http://www.nasra.org/files/Topical%20Reports/Governance%20and 
%20Legislation/Board%20Governance%20Policies/Board%20Composition.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8WJA-CZ23] (appointed and ex-officio positions were 
combined and divided by the overall board size for each plan). For the 
Washington State Law Enforcement Officers and Fire Fighters’ Plan 1 and 
2, see WASH. REV. CODE § 41.26.715(1) (2007). For the Alaska Public 
Employees' Retirement System, see ALASKA STAT. 37.10.210(b). For the 
Maine Public Employees Retirement System, see ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 17102 
(2016). For the Nebraska School Employees Retirement System, see NEB. 
REV. ST. § 79-904. For the New York State and Local Employees 
Retirement System and New York State and Local Police & Fire, see N.Y. 
STATE & LOCAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 2016 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL 
FINANCIAL REPORT (2016), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/retire/about_us/ 
annual_report_2016/index.php [https://perma.cc/JL2U-WH84]. For the 
North Carolina Local Governmental Employees' Retirement System and 
North Carolina Teachers and State Employees Retirement System, see 
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER, TSERS/LGERS 
Board, https://www.nctreasurer.com/ret/Pages/TSERS-and-LGERS-
Board.aspx [https://perma.cc/8XYE-DS2U] (last visited June 3, 2017). 
245 For Funding Ratios, unless noted as an exception, see REBECCA A. 
SIELMAN, 2016 PUBLIC PENSION FUNDING SURVEY, MILLIMAN (2016), 
http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/Periodicals/ppfs/2016-publ 
ic-pension-funding-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JHP-6J9D]. For California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System, see CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 2015–16 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FISCAL REPORT 4 
(2016), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UP7H-XCSF]. For the Funding Ratio for Nebraska 
School Employees Retirement System, see NEB. LEGISLATURE, 2016 
SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF BILLS, 104th Leg. 2d Session, at 84, 
http://nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/committee/retirement/sessionsu
mmary2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5LG-H38X] (last visited June 3, 2017).  
GOEMAN –FINAL  
No. 2:748] THE PRICE ISN’T RIGHT 801 




Funding Ratio of Plan 













































PERS, URS, IA-PERS, GA-
TRS, AR-PERS, TX-TRS, 
IN-PERF, GA-ERS, NV-
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ERS, PA-PSERS, CT-TRS, 
SFERS, NY-TRS, LACERA, 
SDCERS, MN-PERA, 
CalPERS, IL-TRS, IL-




NC-TSERS, VRS, KY-ERS, 
MO-PSRS, NC-TSERS, MN-
SRS, MN-TRA, OH-PERS, 
OH-STRS, OH-OP&F, OH-








 As depicted above, the majority of public pension funds 
analyzed are under-funded; however, a few stand out as 
being fully- or over-funded. WA-LEOFF (Washington State 
Law Enforcement Officers’ and Fire Fighters’ Plan 1 and 2, 
or the “Washington Pension”), NYSTRS (New York State 
Teachers’ Retirement System, or the “New York Pension”), 
SDRS (South Dakota Retirement System, or the “South 
Dakota Pension”), and WRS (Wisconsin Retirement System, 
 
 
246 See infra Appendix A for a list of pension plan acronyms used in 
Table 2.  
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or the “Wisconsin Pension”) have Funded Ratios of 116.9%, 
110.5%, 104.1%, and 102.7%, respectively. Of these, the 
Washington, Wisconsin, and New York Pensions boards are 
most susceptible to political pressure, with 100% of the 
Washington Pension, 85% of the Wisconsin Pension, and 60% 
of the New York Pension being politically affiliated, while 
only 19% of the South Dakota Pension’s board is politically 
affiliated. A number of pension funds are within 5% of being 
fully funded and have boards comprised entirely of 
politically-affiliated trustees, including NY-SLPF (the New 
York State and Local Police & Fire), NC-LGERS (the North 
Carolina Local Governmental Employees’ Retirement 
System), NYSLRS (the New York State and Local Employees 
Retirement System), and OK-PERS (the Oklahoma Public 
Employees Retirement System). The aforementioned pension 
systems represent the institutions that are both exposed to 
political pressure and financially able to leverage an effective 
pharmaceutical pricing proposal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Surging pharmaceutical prices create health and financial 
problems for patients and insurance programs and pose a 
threat to the long-term financial stability of the 
pharmaceutical companies that develop and sell them. While 
shareholders of most companies cannot impact product 
pricing through Rule 14a-8, the SEC has carved a path 
through which shareholders of pharmaceutical companies 
can address these concerns. Yet, shareholders who take 
advantage of that opportunity have been historically 
unsuccessful. The typical vote in such situations is so low 
that each proposal threatens to temporarily remove the path 
altogether because of a resubmission ban. In order to ensure 
that shareholders have access to proxy materials for 
pharmaceutical pricing concerns, and to pressure companies 
to make real changes, institutional investors must wield 
their persuasive and economic power. Institutional investors 
should propose and actively support shareholder proposals 
that pressure boards of pharmaceutical companies to re-
evaluate their pricing strategies in the context of patient 
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access, regulatory approvals, coverage decisions, and long-
term share prices. Such action by institutional investors will 
bring the SEC-created carve-out to fruition and create 
lasting change in the pharmaceutical landscape. 
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APPENDIX A 
 











AL-ERS 66.1% 50% 14 7 
Ala. Teachers’ Ret. 
Sys. 




AK-PERS 64.0% 100% 9 9 
Ariz. State Ret. Sys. AZ-SRS 68.4% 100% 9 9 
Ark Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
AR-PERS 80.4% 100% 9 9 
Ark. Teachers Ret. 
Sys. 
AR-TRS 82.2% 27% 15 4 
Cal. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
CalPERS 69.0% 54% 13 7 
Cal. State Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys. 




CO-PERA 64.2% 33% 12 4 
Conn. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
CT-TRS 61.5% 58% 12 7 
Ga. Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 
GA-ERS 76.2% 100% 7 7 
Ga. Teachers’ Ret. 
Sys. 
GA-TRS 81.4% 100% 10 10 
Idaho Pub. Emp. 
Ret. Sys. 




IL-SERS 35.3% 54% 13 7 
Ill. State Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys. 




IN-PERF 77.3% 100% 6 6 
Ind. State Teachers’ 
Ret. Fund 




IA-PERS 85.2% 100% 11 11 
Kan. Pub. Emp. 
Ret. Sys. 
KS-PERS 64.9% 78% 9 7 
Ky. Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 
KY-ERS 21.7% 44% 9 4 
Ky. Teachers’ Ret. 
Sys. 
KY-TRS 42.5% 22% 9 2 
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L.A. Cnty. Emps. 
Ret. Ass’n 
LACERA 86.3% 56% 9 5 
La. State Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
LASERS 62.7% 33% 9 3 
La. Teachers’ Ret. 
Sys. 
TRSL 62.5% 25% 16 4 
Me. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
MainePERS 81.2% 75% 8 6 
Mich. Pub. Sch. 
Emp.’s Ret. Sys. 
MI-PSERS 62.9% 100% 12 12 
Mich. State Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
MI-ERS 66.0% 100% 9 9 
Minn. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Ass’n 
MN-PERA 78.2% 55% 11 6 
Minn. State Ret. 
Sys. 
MN-SRS 88.3% 38% 8 3 
Minn. Teachers Ret. 
Ass’n 




MS-PERS 61.7% 20% 10 2 
Mo. Pub. School 
Ret. Sys. 
MO-PSRS 85.8% 43% 7 3 
Mo. State 
Employees’ Plan 
MO-SEP 72.6% 73% 11 8 
Neb. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. School 
Ret. Sys.* 
NE-PERS 88.0% 100% 8 8 
Nev. State Pub. 
Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 
NV-PERS 75.1% 100% 7 7 




NJ-PERS 38.2% 33% 9 3 
N.M. Educ. Ret. 
Board 
NM-ERB 64.0% 71% 7 5 
N.M. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Association 
NM-PERA 77.0% 17% 12 2 
N.Y.C. Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys. 
NY-TRS 68.0% 57% 7 4 
N.Y. & Local Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
NYSLRS 97.9% 100% 1 1 
N.Y. State & Local 
Police & Fire 
NY-SLPF 99.0% 100% 1 1 
N.Y. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
NYSTRS 110.5% 60% 10 6 
N.C. Local Gov’t 
Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 
NC-LGERS 98.1% 100% 13 13 
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N.C. Teachers & 
State Emps. Ret. 
Sys. 
NC-TSERS 94.6% 38% 13 5 
Ohio Police & Fire 
Pension Fund 
OH-OP&F 72.2% 33% 9 3 
Ohio Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 




OH-SERS 69.2% 33% 9 3 
Ohio State 
Teachers Ret. Sys. 
OH-STRS 72.1% 36% 11 4 
Okla. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. 
OK-PERS 96.0% 100% 13 13 
Okla. Teachers’ Ret. 
Sys. 
OK-TRS 70.3% 100% 13 13 
Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. 
Sys. 
OR-PERS 91.9% 100% 5 5 
Pa. Pub. Sch. 
Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 




PA-SERS 64.8% 82% 11 9 
R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys. RI-ERS 60.3% 60% 15 9 
San Diego Cnty. 
Emps. Ret. Ass’n 
SDCERS 78.6% 56% 9 5 
S.F. City & Cnty. 
Employees’ Ret. 
Sys. 
SFERS 89.9% 57% 7 4 
S.D. Ret. Sys. SDRS 104.1% 19% 16 3 
Tenn. Consol. Ret. 
Sys. 
TCRS 96.4% 68% 19 13 
Tex. Employees’ 
Ret. Sys. 
TX-ERS 64.4% 50% 6 3 
Tex. Teacher Ret. 
Sys. 
TX-TRS 78.4% 100% 9 9 
Utah Ret. Sys. URS 85.7% 100% 7 7 
Va. Emps. Ret. Sys. VRS 75.0% 44% 9 4 
Wash. State Law 
Enforcement 
Officers’ & Fire 
Fighters’ Plan 1 & 2 
WA-LEOFF 116.9% 100% 11 11 
Wis. Ret. Sys. WRS 102.7% 85% 13 11 
 
